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Abstract For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilib-
rium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equi-
librium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a
sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small uni-
lateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
We know from the pioneering works of Azariadis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983)
thatextrinsicuncertainty mattersincompetitive economies. Doesitmatterinstrategic
markets as well? The answer we get from the literature is unfortunately partial and
thus inconclusive, to some extent.
First of all, we should note that two notions of extrinsic uncertainty, formulated
as sunspot equilibrium in competitive markets (Azariadis 1981; Cass and Shell 1983)
and correlated equilibrium in non-cooperative games (Aumann 1974, 1987), are very
similar in nature and indeed closely connected, as noted earlier (Maskin and Tirole
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(Peck 1994; Forges and Peck 1995; Dávila 1999, among others) that indeed sunspot
equilibria exist in strategic market games al aShapley and Shubik (1977). However
on the other hand, in oligopoly models Liu (1996) and Yi (1997) proved that the only
correlatedequilibriumforsuchgames istheCournot–Nash equilibriumofthemarket,
a result that Neyman (1997) and Ui (2008) subsequently generalised for a large class
of potential games including oligopolies. Hence, one may ask whether there exists a
link between correlation and sunspots in oligopoly models.
Although correlation al aAumann may not achieve anything more than the Nash
equilibrium outcome, as one rightly reckons, a coarsening of the set of correlated
equilibria may exist in certain oligopoly models. Indeed, we do have such a coarse
concept in the literature, introduced by Moulin and Vial (1978), called the coarse
correlated equilibrium,1 that has recently evoked interests in several contexts (for
example, Young 2004; Forgó et al. 2005; Roughgarden 2009; Forgó 2010, 2011). The
best interpretation of this notion is that of a solicitor who asks the players to either
commit to a correlation device or to play any strategy of their own. A correlation
device is called a coarse correlated equilibrium if it is in no player’s interest to choose
any alternative strategy of his own, given that other players choose to commit to the
device.
The set of coarse correlated equilibria may be larger than the set of Nash equilibria
for a game that is not strategically zero-sum (Moulin and Vial 1978), even though the
setofcorrelatedequilibria(alaAumann)maynotbe.Gerard-VaretandMoulin(1978)
has used a modiﬁed version of this concept (with strict inequalities in the equilibrium
condition) in speciﬁc duopoly games to show existence of speciﬁc coarse correlated
equilibria and to achieve local improvement over the Nash equilibrium payoff.
There are however a few gaps worth mentioning in the above strands of literature.
First, from the analysis by Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978), we learn under what
conditions Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game can be locally improved upon,
using a speciﬁc notion of improvement with strategies close to the Nash equilibrium.
However, we do not know whether coarse correlated equilibria even exist for such
models in which these conditions are not met, such as, duopoly models with linear
cost function. Also, it is not clear from their analysis whether the support of such a
coarsecorrelatedequilibriumnecessarilyhastobeclosetotheNashequilibriumornot.
Second,fromtheliteratureoncorrelationandsunspots,wedonotﬁndtheconnection,
if there is any, between (coarse) correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium in
oligopoly models, in particular duopoly games.
The purpose of this paper is precisely to bridge these gaps and thus is twofold. We
would like to ﬁnd whether there exists any general (non-local) coarse correlated equi-
librium in strategic markets and if so, whether this equilibrium relates to the sunspot
1 Although this notion is due to Moulin and Vial (1978), they have not named the equilibrium concept.
They have called such a correlation device a correlation scheme. Young (2004)a n dRoughgarden (2009)
called this equilibrium the coarse correlated equilibrium, while Forgó (2010) called it the weak correlated
equilibrium.
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structure. To achieve these two results, we analyse arguably the most fundamental and
surely the simplest of models in strategic markets, that of a duopoly game with linear
demand and constant marginal cost, called here the linear duopoly game. Establishing
whether(coarse)correlation,likesunspots,mattersinthestrategicmarketmodelofthe
linear duopoly game is by itself important because it reveals what might be achieved
via pre-play communication in the presence of correlation devices in a duopoly, and
such knowledge can also be used to elucidate how players coordinate on an outcome
in this game. We achieve the desired result; we show existence of a coarse correlated
equilibrium which has an obvious sunspot structure for the linear duopoly game.
In this paper, we consider a speciﬁc form of correlation device, that we call a k-
simple symmetric correlation device (k-SSCD), to deﬁne and analyse the concept of
coarse correlated equilibrium. The device is named so (by Ganguly and Ray 2005)
because the discrete probability distribution is symmetric and the support of it is
ﬁnite. We apply the notion of coarse correlation al aMoulin and Vial (1978) and fully
characterise an equilibrium concept that we call k-simple symmetric coarse corre-
latedequilibrium (k-SSCCE)forthelinearduopolygame(Proposition1).Clearly,the
deterministic device that chooses only the Nash equilibrium outcome is a k-SSCCE;
however, unlike Aumann’s correlated equilibrium, this is not the only equilibrium
according to our notion.
We identify a particular sunspot structure, that we call a Nash-centric device,
which is a symmetric anti-diagonal probability distribution over equi-distant quan-
tities around the Nash equilibrium point. We prove that any Nash-centric device is a
k-SSCCE. This result (Theorem 1) holds for any such Nash-centric device, regardless
of its dimension, probabilities and the distance between the quantity levels, as long
as this particular structure is maintained. Moreover, we observe that this is the unique
equilibrium among the devices with equi-distant quantities and anti-diagonal proba-
bility distributions (Theorem 2). Also, we show that any small unilateral perturbation
from this structure is not an equilibrium.
Our results identify a speciﬁc random device that the players are willing to commit
to, in equilibrium. The Nash-centric device is a public randomisation over strategy
proﬁles, including non-Nash equilibrium points, which is the feature of a sunspot
equilibrium. However, we note that the expected payoff from the Nash-centric device
is equal to the Nash equilibrium payoff in the linear duopoly game.
Even though the Nash-centric device can not improve upon the Nash equilibrium
payoff,suchak-SSCCEmayhaveadvantagesoverthedeterministicchoiceoftheNash
equilibrium point in this context.2 First, by using a Nash-centric device, a solicitor
may recommend different quantities that are perhaps optimal for different issues such
as, welfare, employment, environment, for duopoly ﬁrms to achieve in appropriate
contexts. The realised outcomes from the equilibrium may thus attain different goals
and generate the Nash equilibrium payoff in expected terms. Moreover, the device
may even be more desirable to the players than the Nash equilibrium outcome if we
add some convexity in preferences. If the players are mildly risk-seeking (as opposed
2 We thank an anonymous referee and Ferenc Forgó for the interpretation of our result.
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to being risk-neutral), they may ex-ante prefer different Nash-centric outcomes, gen-
erated by the device, to the Nash equilibrium payoff.
2 Set-up
2.1 Correlation and coarse correlation
Fix any ﬁnite normal form game, G =[ N, {Si}i∈N, {ui}i∈N], with set of players,
N ={ 1,...,n}, ﬁnite pure strategy sets, S1,...,Sn with S =
 
i∈N Si, and payoff
functions, u1,...,un, ui : S →  , for all i.
Deﬁnition 1 A (direct) correlation device μ is a probability distribution over S.
A normal form game, G, can be extended by using a direct correlation device.
For correlation al aAumann (1974, 1987), the device ﬁrst selects a strategy proﬁle
s(= (s1,...,sn)) according to μ, and then sends the private recommendation si
to each player i. The extended game Gμ is the game where the correlation device
μ selects and sends recommendations to the players, and then the players play the
original game G. A (pure)3 strategy for player i in the game Gμ is a map σi : Si →
Si and the corresponding (ex-ante, expected) payoff is given by, u∗
i (σ1,...,σ n) =  
s∈S μ(s)ui(σ1(s1),...,σ n(sn)). The obedient strategy proﬁle is the identity map
σ∗




The device is called a correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) if all the players
follow the recommended strategies, i.e., the obedient strategy proﬁle constitutes a
Nash equilibrium of the extended game Gμ. Formally, with the notation s−i ∈ S−i =  
j =i Sj,
Deﬁnition 2 μ is a (direct) correlated equilibrium of the game G if for all i, for all
si, ti ∈ Si,
 
s−i∈S−i μ(si, s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
 
s−i∈S−i μ(si, s−i)ui(ti, s−i).
Onemayusethedirectcorrelationdevice,μ,inadifferentway.Foracoarsernotion
of correlation al aMoulin and Vial (1978), a game G is extended to a game G 
μ in
whichthestrategiesofaplayer iseithertocommit tothedevice ortoplayany strategy
in G. If all the players commit to the device, an outcome is chosen by the device
according to the probability distribution. Thus, the expected payoff for any player
i, when the device is accepted by all the players, is simply
 
s∈S μ(s)ui(s). Note
that this is the same as the payoff of the obedient strategy proﬁle under the correlated
equilibriumalaAumannasabove.Ifoneoftheplayersunilaterallydeviates,whilethe
others commit to the device, the deviant faces the marginal probability distribution μ 
i
over s−i ∈ S−i which is given by μ 
i(s−i) =
 
si∈Si μ(si, s−i). The coarse correlated
equilibrium notion suggests that the players will accept the device if the expected
payoff from the device is at least as high as that from playing any other strategy, from
the entire set of strategies. Formally,
3 One can also think of behavioral strategies in any extended game. We however, in this paper, restrict
ourselves to pure strategies only.
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Deﬁnition 3 μ is a (direct) coarse correlated equilibrium of the game G if for all i,






From the system of inequalities4 in the above deﬁnitions, it is clear that the set
of coarse correlated equilibria is indeed coarser than the set of correlated equilibria.5
Also, it is obvious that any Nash equilibrium and any convex combination of several
Nash equilibria of any given game G is both a coarse correlated and a correlated
equilibrium.6
2.2 Linear duopoly
In this paper, we use the simplest form of oligopoly models, that of a duopoly market
withlineardemandfunctionandconstantmarginalcost.Considertwoquantity-setting
ﬁrms, each of whose strategy is to choose a quantity level q ∈ Q ={ q : q ≥ 0}
to produce at a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0 and to sell in a market with an inverse
demand function given by a − b(q1 + q2), with a > 0 and b > 0. Thus the proﬁt
functions for the ﬁrms are given by  1(q1, q2) = aq1 − b(q1)2 − bq1q2 − cq1 and
 2(q1, q2) = aq2 −b(q2)2 −bq1q2 −cq2, where q1 and q2 are quantity choices of
ﬁrms 1 and 2, respectively. For simplicity and without loss of any generality, for the
rest of the paper, we set c = 0. As is well-known, the Nash equilibrium outcome of
this game is q1 = q2 = qNE = a
3b and the Nash equilibrium payoff to each ﬁrm is
a2
9b. For the rest of the paper this two-person game will be called the linear duopoly
game.
Liu(1996)analysedanoligopolymodelwithn ﬁrms,eachwithaconstantmarginal
cost, ci for ﬁrm i (i = 1,...,n) operating in a market with linear demand, and
proved that the only correlated equilibrium of this game is the unique Cournot–Nash
equilibrium. Our game, clearly, is a special case of Liu’s model with n = 2, and
c1 = c2 = 0. Neyman (1997) and Ui (2008) generalised Liu’s result for potential
games. Our game is a potential game with a smooth and concave potential function f,
given by f (q1, q2) = a(q1 + q2) − b[(q1)2 + q1q2 + (q2)2]. Therefore, the linear
duopoly game has a unique correlated equilibrium al aAumann that coincides with
the Nash equilibrium of the game.
One may also wish to directly apply the result obtained by Gerard-Varet and
Moulin (1978), for improvement upon the Nash equilibrium payoff by coarse cor-
relation, in our game. Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978) introduced a speciﬁc notion
of improvement using their coarse correlated equilibrium notion (see Footnote 4
4 FollowingAumann(1974)andMoulinandVial(1978),wehaveusedweakinequalitiesinourdeﬁnitions
(Deﬁnitions2and3).Wenotethatstrictinequalitiesmaybeconsideredinthesedeﬁnitions;indeed,Gerard-
Varet and Moulin (1978) did so in their deﬁnition of equilibrium.
5 It is also easy to prove that the set of correlated and coarse correlated equilibria coincide for the case of
2 × 2 games. However, as Moulin and Vial (1978) demonstrated, there are games involving two players
and three strategies for each player, for which the set of coarse correlated equilibria is strictly larger than
the sets of correlated and Nash equilibria.
6 Formally, let NE(G), CONV(G), CE(G) and CCE(G) denote, respectively, the sets of all Nash
equilibria, convex combination of Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria for
any game G. Clearly, NE(G) ⊆ CONV(G) ⊆ CE(G) ⊆ CCE(G).
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above), with correlation devices whose support involve strategies close to the Nash
equilibrium outcome. They provided conditions under which such an improve-
ment is attained in duopoly games. Their theorem, unfortunately, does not apply
to our linear duopoly game. However, as pointed out in their paper (Gerard-
Varet and Moulin 1978, p. 133), it can be directly proved that the Nash equilib-
rium of this game can not be improved upon by coarse correlation, using their
approach.
2.3 Simple devices
We now consider a speciﬁc form of a correlation device for our game. Although
the strategy sets in games such as the linear duopoly game are continuous, a device
may involve only ﬁnitely many strategies, i.e., the support of the probability distri-
bution in the direct correlation device may be ﬁnite. The structure of such a simple
device was used by Ganguly and Ray (2005) in their analysis of simple mediation
in cheap-talk games. Here, we consider such simple devices to analyse coarse cor-
relation in the linear duopoly game. Moreover, we impose symmetry in the prob-
ability distribution and we restrict the device to use the same quantities for both
players. Formally, the speciﬁc form of the device we consider in this paper is deﬁned
below.
Deﬁnition 4 A k-SSCD, [P; qc], is a symmetric probability distribution matrix, P,
over qc × qc, where, qc = (q1, q2,...,qk), with 0 < q1 < q2 < ··· < qk; qi ∈
Q, and P ={ (pij)i=1,2,...,k;j=1,2,...,k} with each pij ∈[ 0, 1], pij = pji and  
ij pij = 1.
The interpretation of a k-SSCD, [P; qc]=[ { (pij)i=1,2,...,k;j=1,2,...,k};
(qi)i=1,2,...,k], is that the players are given a choice to commit to the device. If
both players commit, the device will then pick the strategies qi and qj for the two
players respectively, with probability pij; the players do not play the game, how-
ever get the proﬁts  1(qi, qj) and  2(qi, qj) respectively, that correspond to the
chosen strategy proﬁle (qi, qj). Thus, if both players commit to the device, the
expected payoffs for the two players are the same (by symmetry) and are given by
EP( ) =
 
ij pijπ1(qi, qj) =
 
ij pijπ2(qi, qj) =
 
ij pij[aqi − bq2
i − bqiqj].
Each player may unilaterally deviate to choose any strategy in the game, while
the other commits to the device. Note that although the device [P; qc] involves only
ﬁnitelymanystrategies,thedeviationforaplayerishowevernotrestricted;anystrategy
q ∈ Q (even outside the domain, qc, of the device) can be played by a player if he
doesn’t commit to the device. The deviant faces the marginal probability distribution
p  over qj ∈ qc which is given by p (qj) =
 
qi∈qc p(qi,qj). Let EP(  | q) denote
the expected payoff of any deviating player (by symmetry) from playing q. Clearly,
EP(  | q) =
 
qj∈qc p (qj) (q, qj) =
 
qj∈qc p (qj)[aq − bq2 − bqqj]. As
mentioned, the equilibrium condition requires that the device be accepted by both
players. Formally,
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Deﬁnition 5 A k-SSCD, [P; qc], is called a k-SSCCE if both players commit to the
device, i.e., given that the other player is committing to the device, a player does
not deviate to play any other strategy q ∈ Q, i.e., EP( ) ≥ EP(  | q), for all
q ∈ Q.
2.4 Nash-centric devices
We now consider different types of k-SSCD, [P; qc], for our analysis in this paper.
Ak-SSCDwithequi-distantquantitiesisadeviceforwhichqi = q1+(i−1)d, 1 ≤
i ≤ k, and thus can be denoted by [P; q1; d].
A public or sunspot k-SSCD is a device for which the probability distribution P is
such that whenever pij > 0, the conditional probability of qi is 1, and vice versa (in
other words, each row and each column in the probability distribution matrix has one
and only one positive element).
An anti-diagonal k-SSCD is a device for which the probability distribution P is an
anti-diagonal distribution in which only the anti-diagonal elements of the probability
distribution matrix are strictly positive, i.e., pij > 0 when i + j = k +1 and pij = 0
when i + j  = k + 1. Clearly, an anti-diagonal k-SSCD is a special case of a public
or sunspot k-SSCD and can be characterised by its positive anti-diagonal elements
only.
A Nash-centric k-SSCD is a device with equi-distant quantities and anti-diagonal
probability distribution for which the quantities are “Nash-centric”. We distinguish
between the two cases based on the dimension of qc being odd or even. The Nash
equilibrium quantity is included in the middle of the vector qc, for the “odd” case,
however, not in the “even” case.
Formally, for any odd k (k = 2m +1), a Nash-centric k-SSCD is given by qm+1 =
qNE = a
3b and qi = qNE − (m + 1 − i)δ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k = 2m + 1, with δ>0
and δ< a
3bm (so that q1 > 0). For any even k (k = 2m), a Nash-centric k-SSCD is
a device with qi = qNE − (2m + 1 − 2i)δ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k = 2m, with δ>0 and
δ< a
3b(2m−1) (so that q1 > 0).
The anti-diagonal probability distribution associated with this device is charac-
terised by its positive anti-diagonal elements only.
Formally,foranyoddk (k = 2m+1),let pi for1 ≤ i ≤ m,betheprobabilityofboth
strategy proﬁles (qi, qk+1−i) and (qk+1−i, qi) and (1 − 2
 m
i=1 pi)>0 be the prob-
ability attached to the Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle, i.e., pi(k+1−i) = p(k+1−i)i =
pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, p(m+1)(m+1) = 1 − 2
 m
i=1 pi and pij = 0, otherwise. For any
even k (k = 2m), let pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, be the probability of both strategy proﬁles
(qi, qk+1−i) and (qk+1−i, qi), with 2
 m
i=1 pi = 1, i.e., pi(k+1−i) = p(k+1−i)i = pi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and pij = 0, otherwise.
ANash-centricdevice(foranydimension)thuscanbedeﬁnedby[k; (pi)1≤i≤m; δ].
We present such a Nash-centric device in a tabular form below for any odd k
(k = 2m + 1).
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Strategies q1 q2 … … qm+1 … … … qk
q1 = qNE − mδ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1
q2 = qNE − (m − 1)δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 0
… … … … … … … … … …
… … … … … … … … … …
qm+1 = qNE = a
3b 0 0 0 0 1 − 2
 m
i=1 pi 0 0 0 0
… … … … … … … … … …
… … … … … … … … … …
qk−1 = qNE + (m − 1)δ 0 p2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




game. Following Deﬁnition 5,ak-SSCD is in equilibrium when the expected payoff
from the device is at least as high as that from any unilateral deviation by a player.
Hence, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for equilibrium is that the expected payoff
from the device is at least as high as the maximum of the payoffs from any unilateral
deviation. A k-SSCCE is thus characterised in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 A k-SSCD, [P; qc], is a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game if and
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Proof From Deﬁnition 5, for any k-SSCD [P; qc] to be a k-SSCCE in the linear
duopoly game, we must have EP( ) ≥ EP(  | q), for all q ∈ Q, which holds true
if and only if EP( ) − EP( ∗) ≥ 0, where EP( ∗) = Maxq∈QEP(  | q).
First, we observe
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Now, using the ﬁrst order condition,
∂EP( |q)
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Nowdeﬁne AP(qc) = EP( )−EP( ∗),whichleadstothecharacterisinginequal-
ity in the statement of the proposition.    
Clearly, the Nash equilibrium of the linear duopoly game can be viewed as a device
with probability 1 on the Nash equilibrium quantity, a
3b, and is trivially a k-SSCCE.
This fact is observed in the above characterisation. Note that at the Nash equilibrium
point, the value of AP(qc) stated in Proposition 1 is indeed 0, satisfying the condi-
tion weakly. Hence, the unique Nash equilibrium and the correlated equilibrium al a
Aumann of the linear duopoly game is indeed a k -SSCCE.
The characterisation provided in Proposition 1 is important to analyse any
k-SSCCE, in particular those with equi-distant quantities. We will use this charac-
terisation to prove some propositions later in this paper.
3.2 Uniqueness
We now show that the unique Nash equilibrium and the correlated equilibrium al a
Aumannofthelinearduopolygameisnottheonlyk-SSCCEforthisgame.AnyNash-
centricdeviceisalsoak-SSCCEforthelinearduopolygame.Moreover,Nash-centric
devices are the only equilibria among the set of k-SSCDs with equi-distant quantities
and anti-diagonal probability distribution.
To prove this uniqueness result, we observe a couple of properties of any k-SSCD
with equi-distant quantities and anti-diagonal probability distribution.7 We ﬁrst note
that the expected payoff from any k-SSCD with equi-distant quantities and anti-
diagonal probability distribution, Ed( ), can be expressed in terms of the expected
quantity of a player, q, as deﬁned below.
Letusformallydeﬁneq forak-SSCDwithequi-distantquantitiesandanti-diagonal
probability distribution.
7 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting Lemmata 1 and 2 to prove Theorems 1 and 2 directly
using them.
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For an odd k (= 2m + 1), q =
 m




for an even k (= 2m), q =
 m
i=1 pi(qi +q2m+1−i), with qi = q1 +(i −1)d, 1 ≤
i ≤ k.
Thus, for an odd k (= 2m + 1), q = q1 + md, and for an even k (= 2m),
q = q1 + d(2m−1)
2 . Now note that for a Nash-centric device with an odd k (with
d = δ), q1 = qNE−mδ,while for an even k (with d = 2δ), q1 = qNE−(2m −1)δ.
Therefore, for a Nash-centric device, for any k, q = qNE.
We now denote the proﬁt of any player in the linear duopoly game, when both
players play the expected quantity q, by  (q, q) and state the following result.
Lemma 1 The expected proﬁt of each player following any k-SSCD with equi-distant
quantities and anti-diagonal probability distribution is equal to the proﬁt when both
players play their expected quantities in the linear duopoly game, i.e., Ed( ) =
 (q, q).
TheproofofLemma1isstraightforwardandthushasbeenpostponedtotheAppen-
dix. From Lemma 1, it follows immediately that the expected payoff from a Nash-
centric device, ENC( ), is actually equal to that of the Nash equilibrium of the linear
duopoly game, that is, ENC( ) = a2
9b.
Wenowconsidertheexpectedpayoffofanydeviatingplayerfromplayinganystrat-
egy q, Ed(  | q), and the maximum payoff from deviating, Maxq∈QEd(  | q) =
Ed( ∗) (say). The following lemma conﬁrms that the best response of a deviating
player depends only on his (opponent’s) expected quantity.
Lemma 2 Ed( ∗) is a function of q.
The proof of Lemma 2 is also straightforward and hence has been postponed to the
Appendix. Our results (Theorems 1, 2) now follow from the above lemmata.
Theorem 1 Any Nash-centric device is a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game.
Proof From Lemma 1, ENC( ) = a2
9b. Let ENC(  | q) denote the (expected) payoff
of the deviant from playing q. From Lemma 2, for any k, ENC(  | q) = aq−bq2 −
bqqNE.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, for the Nash-centric device to be a k-SSCCE, we
must have ENC( ) ≥ ENC(  | q) for all q ∈ Q, which holds true if and only if
ENC( ) ≥ Maxq∈QENC(  | q) = ENC( ∗) (say).






3b = qNE, with ENC( ∗) = aq∗ − bq∗2 − bq∗qNE = ENC( ).
Hence, ENC( ) = ENC( ∗) = Maxq∈QENC(  | q), and thus any Nash-centric
device is a k-SSCCE.    




We observe that Theorem 1 holds for any Nash-centric device, i.e., for any dimen-
sion k, any appropriate δ>0 (as long as q1 > 0) and any anti-diagonal probability
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distributiongivenbytheprobabilities pi,for1 ≤ i ≤ m,maintainingtheNash-centric
structure.
We now prove that Nash-centric is the unique equilibrium structure among any
k-SSCDs with equi-distant quantities and anti-diagonal probability distributions.
Theorem 2 Nash-centric devices are the only k-SSCCE with equi-distant quantities
and an anti-diagonal probability distribution for the linear duopoly game.
Proof Consider any k-SSCD with equi-distant quantities and an anti-diagonal prob-
ability distribution. For this to be a k-SSCCE, we must have Ed( ) − Ed( ∗) ≥ 0.
Now, for any odd k (= 2m + 1) with q = q1 + md,
Ed( ) − Ed( ∗) =
 
aq1 − 2bq2

























For any even k (= 2m) with q = q1 + d(2m−1)
2 ,




1 − 2bd(2m − 1)q1 +
ad
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We now treat Ed( ) − Ed( ∗) as a function of q1 and ﬁnd the maximum of this
function.Clearly,foranyoddk,thisfunctionismaximisedat   q1 = a
3b −md,whichis
the Nash-centric quantity q1 (with the distance between quantities d = δ). Similarly,
for any even k, this function is maximised at   q1 = a
3b − δ(2m − 1), the Nash-centric
quantity q1 (with the distance between quantities d = 2δ). Thus, for any k, the Nash-
centric quantity q1 maximises the function Ed( )− Ed( ∗) and the maximum value
of this function becomes ENC( )− ENC( ∗), which is 0 as ENC( ) = ENC( ∗).
Thus the value of the function Ed( )− Ed( ∗) for any other quantity q1 is negative.
Hence, the equilibrium condition is (weakly) satisﬁed only for Nash-centric devices
and is not met for any other k-SSCD with equi-distant quantities and an anti-diagonal
probability distribution.    
We now provide an example to falsify the above theorem in an extended domain.
Example1belowindicatesthatTheorem2doesnotholdforadevicewithNash-centric
quantities however with a modiﬁed probability distribution, even for k = 3.
Example 1 Consider a 3-SSCD, with Nash-centric quantities, q1 = qNE − δ,
q2 = qNE and q3 = qNE + δ, 0 <δ< a
3b, however with a non-anti-diagonal
probability distribution. Let us modify the anti-diagonal probability distribution by
introducing positive elements around the anti-diagonal elements and take the prob-
abilities to be: p11 = p33 = 0, p13 = p31 = p − 2ε, p22 = 1 − 2p and
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p12 = p21 = p23 = p32 = ε, where ε (> 0) is small. The expected payoff from
following this device is given by
ENAD( ) = ε
 
aq1 − bq2




















= aq2 − 2bq2
2 − 2bεδ2.
Let ENAD(  | q) denote the expected payoff of the deviant from playing q.
ENAD(  | q) = aq − bq2 − bq [(p − ε)q1 + (p − ε)q3 + (1 − 2p + 2ε)q2]
= aq − bq2 − bqq2,
which is maximised at q∗ =
a−bq2












−2bεδ2 < 0, as q2 = qNE = a
3b. Therefore, this 3-SSCD is not a 3-SSCCE in the
linear duopoly game.
We now use the characterisation in Proposition 1 of a k-SSCCE, to ﬁnd the equilib-
riumconditionforanyk-SSCDwithequi-distantquantities.Thefollowingproposition
characterisesprobabilitydistributionsforsuchak-SSCCEforthelinearduopolygame.
Proposition 2 For the linear duopoly game, any probability distribution P can be




























(i − 1)(j − 1)pij ≥ 0.
The proof follows from Proposition 1 and hence has been postponed to the Appen-
dix. The characterisation presented above can be used to identify the unique structure
of any 2-SSCCE, as Example 2 below shows.
Example 2 We claim that the only 2-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game has to be a
Nash-centric device with q1 = qNE − δ and q2 = qNE + δ for any 0 <δ< a
3b (to
keep q1 > 0) and p12 = p21 = 1
2. Note that a 2-SSCCE can trivially be viewed as a
device with equi-distant quantities. By Theorem 2, the equilibrium quantities can be
written asq1 = qNE−δ and q2 = qNE+δ,for any 0 <δ< a
3b. One can now use the
equilibrium condition in Proposition 2 for such quantities, for k = 2, which becomes
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p12 −2MN ≥ 0, where M = p11 + p12 and N = 1− M. The LHS of this condition
can easily be rearranged to −(p22M + p11N), which clearly is always < 0, unless
p11 = p22 = 0. Hence the equilibrium probabilities must be p12 = p21 = 1
2.
In what follows, we deal only with Nash-centric devices. All the results in the rest
of the paper relate to the characterisations presented in Propositions 1 and 2.
3.3 Convexity
We ﬁrst ask whether Nash-centric devices are equilibria for nonlinear duopoly games
or not. To do so, we consider a duopoly market with linear demand function, however
with (strictly) increasing and (strictly) convex costs (as analysed by Yi 1997), where
the ﬁrms’ strategy is to choose a quantity q ∈ Q ={ q : q ≥ 0}. The price and the
cost function for ﬁrm i are respectively given by pi(q1, q2) = a −qi −γq j, j  = i,
with a > 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and C(qi) with C (qi)>0 and C  (qi)>0, for i = 1, 2.
Firm i’s proﬁt is thus  i(q1, q2) = pi(q1, q2)·qi −C(qi), where q1 and q2 are the
quantity choices of ﬁrms 1 and 2.
WeshowbelowthattheNash-centricdevicesmayfailtobeanequilibriumwhenthe
costs are strictly convex. The expected payoff from following a Nash-centric device
in such a convex set-up is as follows.
For k = 2m + 1,
ENC( ) = aqNE − q2




piC(qNE) − 2(1 − γ)δ2
m  
i=1




pi [C (qNE− (m + 1 − i)δ) + C (qNE+ (m + 1 − i)δ)],
and for k = 2m,
ENC( ) = aqNE − q2
NE(1 + γ)− 2(1 − γ)δ2
m  
i=1




pi [C (qNE− (2m + 1 − 2i)δ) + C (qNE+ (2m + 1 − 2i)δ)].
It is clear that arguments provided in Lemmata 1 and 2 do not apply here and
therefore it is intuitively clear that Theorem 1 will not hold in the strictly convex case.
We however prove this result formally using the explicit characterisation provided
in Proposition 1. To do so, one needs a speciﬁc convex cost function. We consider
a quadratic cost function, C(qi) = a (qi)2 + b qi + c , with a , b  and c  > 0,
as an example. Let us call the duopoly game with this cost function the quadratic
duopoly game. The Nash equilibrium quantity for this quadratic duopoly game is
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qNE = a−b 
2(1+a )+γ . Indeed, for the quadratic duopoly game, no Nash-centric device is
an equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Any Nash-centric device is not a k-SSCCE for the quadratic duopoly
game.
TheproofoftheabovepropositionisverysimilartothatofProposition1andhence
has been postponed to the Appendix.
3.4 Robustness
In this subsection, we prove that the Nash-centric structure is not robust as an equi-
librium in the linear duopoly game by showing that any small unilateral perturbation
of this device leads to a violation of the equilibrium condition. We consider small
unilateral changes in probabilities and quantities; ﬁrst, in the probability distribution
keeping the quantity levels unchanged, and then, in the quantity levels keeping the




with a Nash-centric device, without changing the quantities, which still remain Nash-
centric. We divide the perturbation in probabilities into two cases: ﬁrst, we change
one of the zero off-diagonal elements and then we change one of the zero diagonal
elements.
First, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we change the ﬁrst off-diagonal
element and make it positive. Let us make 0 < p12 = p21 (< 1
2) and as a con-
sequence, (some of) the anti-diagonal probabilities will change. For an odd k, for
simplicity, we change only the probability attached to the Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁle, p(m+1)(m+1), to (1−2
 m
i=1 pi −2p12), with the rest of probabilities remain-
ing intact. For an even k, we need not specify the speciﬁc changes in the anti-diagonal
probabilities, as long as 1 − 2
 m
i=1 pi = 2p12. Let us call this new device, for any
k, an off-diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device and prove the following
desired result.
Proposition 4 Any off-diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device is not a
k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game.
Now, for simplicity and without loss of generality, let us change the ﬁrst diagonal
element and make it positive, i.e., let us make p11 > 0, and as a consequence let
us change (some of) the anti-diagonal probabilities. As earlier, for an odd k, for
simplicity, we change only the probability attached to the Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁle, p(m+1)(m+1), to 1 − 2
 m
i=1 pi − p11, keeping the rest of the probabilities
intact. For an even k, we need not specify the speciﬁc changes in the anti-diagonal
probabilities, as long as 1 − 2
 m
i=1 pi = p11. Let us call this new device, for any k,
a diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device.
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Proposition 5 Any diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device is not a k-





We now consider a small perturbation in the quantity levels, keeping the anti-diagonal
probability distribution ﬁxed. For simplicity and without loss of generality, let us
change the ﬁrst quantity. For k = 2m +1, let q1 = qNE−mδ +ε, while for k = 2m,
let q1 = qNE − (2m − 1)δ + ε, keeping all other quantities to be Nash-centric and
equi-distant from each other. Let us call this new device a quantity-perturbed device.
Proposition 6 Any quantity-perturbed Nash-centric device is not a k-SSCCE for the
linear duopoly game.
3.4.3 Composition
Finally, we turn to another way of perturbing a Nash-centric device. We consider a
newdevicecomposedofoneadditionalquantitylevel(otherthantheNashequilibrium
quantity) along with the original Nash-centric device. Starting from a Nash-centric k-
SSCCE (for any k), we construct a public (k + 1)-SSCD by adding another quantity
qε > 0(  = a
3b) for both players, with probability ε for the strategy proﬁle (qε, qε),
coupledwiththeoriginalNash-centricdevicewithprobability(1−ε).Formally,given
a Nash-centric device, [k; (pi)1≤i≤m; δ], we construct a (k + 1)-SSCD, as follows.
For any odd k (= 2m + 1), the quantities are q1 = qε, qm+2 = qNE = a
3b and
qi = qNE−(m +2−i)δ for 2 ≤ i ≤ k +1(= 2m +2), while for any even k (= 2m),
they are qi = qNE − (2m + 3 − 2i)δ for 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1(= 2m + 1).
The probabilities are p11 = ε, p1j = pj1 = 0f o rj = 2,...,k + 1( f o ra n y
k). For odd k (= 2m + 1), pi(k+3−i) = p(k+3−i)i = (1 − ε)pi−1, for 2 ≤ i ≤
m + 1, p(m+2)(m+2) = (1 − ε)(1 − 2
 m
i=1 pi) and pij = 0, otherwise; for even k
(= 2m), pi(k+3−i) = p(k+3−i)i = (1 − ε)pi−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ m + 1 and pij = 0,




j=2 pij = (1 − ε).
We call this device a composite device.
Proposition 7 Any composite device is not a (k + 1)-SSCCE for the linear duopoly
game.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the notion of coarse correlation in the simplest of the
oligopoly models, that of a duopoly with linear market demand and constant marginal
costs.Wehavedeﬁnedandcharacterisedanequilibriumnotion,thatwecallk-SSCCE,
for this linear duopoly game. We have identiﬁed a particular sunspot structure, that
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we call a Nash-centric device, which always serves as an equilibrium for such a game;
moreover, any small perturbation from this device is not an equilibrium.
AnyNash-centricdeviceisaspecialtypeofapublicorsunspotk-SSCD,asdeﬁned
inthispaper,andbyTheorem1,isalsoak-SSCCE.WeshouldpointoutherethatNash-
centric devices assign positive probabilities over non-Nash equilibrium quantities as
well. Such a sunspot structure is clearly not a correlated equilibrium al aAumann, as
itiswell-knownthatapublic devicecanonlybeacorrelatedequilibriumalaAumann
if and only if it is a convexiﬁcation of pure Nash equilibria.
We however note that the expected payoff from such a device is equal to the Nash
equilibrium payoff. We have also pointed out that although any Nash-centric device
is a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game, such devices may however fail to be so in
duopoly models with strictly convex costs such as the one studied by Yi (1997). In a
parallel paper, Moulin et al. (2012) extensively analyse coarse correlated equilibria in
quadratic potential games and show that, for any general quadratic duopoly model, k-
SSCCE (even 2-SSCCE), other thanthe Nash-centric devices, existsand considerably
improves upon the Nash equilibrium payoff.
One may extend our research to several directions.8 First, following Young (2004),
one may ask under what conditions the regret-minimisation dynamics converges to
the set of Nash-centric devices in our set-up. Second, our main result is similar in
spirit to the work by Börgers and Janssen (1995) who identify conditions under which
the Nash equilibrium of the oligopolists’ game is the only outcome that survives
iterateddeletionofdominatedstrategies.Itwillthusbeinterestingtoformallyconnect
these two strands of literature. Third, Forgó et al. (2005) analysed a related notion,
called the soft correlated equilibrium, in climate change models. We can similarly
analyse our k-SSCCE, in particular Nash-centric devices, in such models where the
objective function to be maximised can be different from the sum of payoffs (such
as, reduction in temperature in climate change models). Finally, a new experimental
literaturesuggeststhatplayersfollowrecommendationsfromacorrelatedequilibrium
(Cason and Sharma 2007; Duffy and Feltovich 2010; Bone et al. 2012). One may also
test our equilibrium concept, k-SSCCE, in a suitably chosen experimental set-up to
achieve the Nash equilibrium payoff in expected terms. We defer all these issues to
future research agenda.
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5 Appendix
We collect the proofs of some our results in this section.
8 We thank Ferenc Forgó and an anonymous referee for suggesting some of these issues.
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Proof of Lemma 1 The proﬁt of a ﬁrm is given by  (q, q) = aq − 2bq2.
For k = 2m + 1, we have q = q1 + md. Substituting the value of q, we get
 (q, q) = aq1 − 2bq2
1 − 4bmdq1 + amd − 2bm2d2.
The expected payoff from any k-SSCD with equi-distant quantities and an anti-
























= aq1 − 2bq2
1 − 4bmdq1 + amd − 2bm2d2 =  (q, q).
Similarly for k = 2m, we have q = q1 + d(2m−1)
2 . In this case,
 (q, q) = aq1 − 2bq2




















= aq1 − 2bq2







=  (q, q).
   
Proof of Lemma 2 For any k, suppose a player deviates from the k-SSCD with equi-
distant quantities and an anti-diagonal probability distribution to play an alternate
strategy q. We have










⎠ = aq − bq2 − bqq,
which is maximised at q =
a−bq




for any k, which proves the lemma.    
Proof of Proposition 2 Given a distribution P, consider a k-SSCD with equi-distant
quantities [P; q1; d]. We will use the equilibrium condition AP(qc) ≥ 0, in Proposi-
tion 1 for such a k -SSCD. Substituting the values of qi = q1 + (i − 1)d, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
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To be an equilibrium, the above expression needs to be ≥ 0, for some values of
q1 and d. For any d > 0, we can view this expression as a function of q1. Thus,
a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium is that
the maximum value of this function be ≥ 0. Using the ﬁrst order condition, this is
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(i − 1)(j − 1)pij
⎤
⎦.
The equilibrium condition thus requires the above to be ≥ 0. As both b and d are
> 0, this leads to the statement in the proposition.    
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider any Nash-centric device for the quadratic duopoly
game. The expected payoff from following a Nash-centric device is given by
ENC( ) = (a − b )qNE− (1 + a  + γ)q2
NE− c  − 2δ2(2 − γ)
m  
i=1
pi(m + 1 − i)2,
for any odd k, and
ENC( )=(a − b )qNE− (1 + a  + γ)q2




for any even k.
Let ENC(  | q) denote the expected payoff of the deviant from playing q. For any
k, ENC(  | q) = aq−q2−γqqNE−[a q2+b q+c ].AsintheproofofProposition1,
fortheNash-centricdevicetobeak-SSCCE,wemusthave, ENC( ) ≥ ENC(  | q),
for all q ∈ Q, which holds true if and only if ENC( ) ≥ Maxq∈QENC(  | q). Note
that ENC(  | q) is maximised at q∗ =
a−b −γqNE
2(1+a ) , and hence, Maxq∈QENC(  |






2(1+a ) − c .
Now,substitutingthevalueofqNEintheaboveexpressions,wehavefork = 2m+
1, ENC( )−Maxq∈QENC(  | q) =− 2δ2(2−γ)
 m
i=1 pi(m+1−i)2 < 0,andfor
k=2m, ENC( )−Maxq∈QENC(  | q)=−2δ2(2−γ)
 m
i=1 pi(2m +1−2i)2<0.
Hence, the Nash-centric device is not an equilibrium for this game.    
Proof of Proposition 4 For k = 2m + 1, from Proposition 2, the equilibrium condi-
tion for the off-diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device to be a k-SSCCE
becomes






(i − 1)pi + m
 















(i − 1)2pi + m2
 






















(i − 1)(2m + 1 − i)pi
 
≥ 0.
After simpliﬁcation, the LHS of the above turns out to be (2m − 1)2p21(2p21 − 1),
which is always < 0, as p21 < 1
2.
Similarlyfork = 2m,theequilibriumconditionturnsouttobe4(m−1)2p21(2p21−
1), which is always < 0, as p21 < 1
2.
Hence, the equilibrium condition is violated for any k.    
Proof of Proposition 5 Fork = 2m+1,fromProposition2,theequilibriumcondition
for the diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device to be a k-SSCCE becomes
2
  m  
i=1
(i − 1)pi + m
 








(2m + 1 − i)pi
 2
−
  m  
i=1
(i − 1)2pi + m2
 
























(i − 1)(2m + 1 − i)pi
  
≥ 0.
Simplifying, the LHS of the above turns out to be −2m2p11(1 − p11), which is
always < 0.
Similarly for k = 2m, the equilibrium condition turns out to be (2m −









, which is ≥ 0 if and only if
 m
i=1 pi ≥ 1
2, which
is not possible as p11 > 0.
Hence, the equilibrium condition is violated for any k.    
Proof of Proposition 6 From Proposition 1, substituting the values of q1 and other qi
























For the quantity-perturbed Nash-centric device to be a k-SSCCE, we need the above




4 ), which is always < 0. Hence, the equilibrium condition is violated.    
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Proof of Proposition 7 Following Proposition 1, for the composite device (for any k)





























Substituting qNE = a





36b , which can be viewed as a (quadratic) function in qε. This
function is maximised at qε = a
3b (the Nash equilibrium quantity) and the maximised
value of the function is 0. Therefore, for any qε > 0, other than the Nash Equilibrium
quantity, the value of AP(qc) is < 0.
From Proposition 1, for the composite device to be a (k + 1)-SSCCE, we need
the above AP(qc) to be ≥ 0. However, from above, the value of the above function is
< 0,foranyqε > 0,otherthantheNashEquilibriumquantity.Hence,theequilibrium
condition is violated.    
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